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Capturing licence plates: police-citizen interaction apps from
an EU data protection perspective
Jonida Milaj and Gerard Jan Ritsema van Eck
Security, Technology, and e-Privacy (SteP) Research Group, University of Groningen, Groningen, Netherlands
ABSTRACT
A Pokémon Go-like smartphone app called ‘Automon’ was unveiled
in October 2017 as one of several new initiatives to increase the
public’s contribution and engagement in police investigations in
the Netherlands. Automon is designed in the form of a game that
instigates participants to photograph license plates to ﬁnd out if a
vehicle is stolen. The participants in the game score points for
each license plate photographed, and may also qualify for a
ﬁnancial reward if a vehicle is actually stolen. In addition, when
someone reports that a vehicle has been recently stolen, game
participants that are in the vicinity receive a push notiﬁcation and
are tasked with searching for that particular vehicle and license
plate. This paper studies the example of the Automon app and
contributes to the existing debate on crowdsourced surveillance
and the involvement of individuals in law enforcement activities
from an EU law perspective. It analyses the lawfulness of
initiatives that proactively require individuals to be involved in law
enforcement activities and confronts them for the ﬁrst time with
European Union (EU) data protection standards. It is concluded
that the Automon app design does not meet the new legal
standards.
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So can we make an app, Automon, and make it a game to ﬁnd stolen cars back who are some-
where in Holland? (Bart Driessen, Dutch national police force)
In October 2017 the Dutch police chief Erik Akerboom revealed several new initiatives
to increase the public’s contribution and engagement in investigation activities (van den
Heuvel and van Wely 2017; Vries 2017). One of these initiatives is the development of a
Pokémon Go-like1 smartphone app called ‘Automon’ (Figure 1).2 Automon is designed
in the form of a game that instigates participants to photograph license plates to ﬁnd
out if a vehicle is stolen. The participants in the game score points for each license
plate photographed, and in case the car is indeed stolen they might also qualify for a
ﬁnancial reward. In addition, when someone reports that a car has recently been stolen,
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game participants from the neighbourhood receive a push notiﬁcation and are tasked to
search for that speciﬁc license plate. The more stolen cars you ﬁnd, the higher your score,
and the more money you can collect.
The launch of Automon is indicative of broad trends within policing and society. Partici-
pation can be said to be a general characteristic of surveillance (Albrechtslund and Laur-
itsen 2013, 314) and the involvement of individuals in police activities is not a new
phenomenon. Distributing labour between law enforcement and individuals is considered
fruitful as it relies on a multitude of watchers and has the advantage of achieving a par-
ticular goal that could otherwise be diﬃcult to achieve because of the limited resources
available to law enforcement. The Automon app is also a form of crowdsourcing,
though it is particularly interesting as it diﬀers from usual crowdsourcing practices. Nor-
mally in crowdsourced policing individuals are asked ex post to contribute valuable evi-
dence they might have captured with their devices while being part of an event at the
right time and place. The Automon app, on the other side, proactively asks individuals
to collect evidence, and thus to turn into surveillants. By gathering evidence, individuals
collect, retain and share with law enforcement personal data of others. The simple partici-
pation in a game with the scope to assist law enforcement in their activities could turn
individuals into data controllers or processors and impose upon them the rights and obli-
gations prescribed by the applicable laws and regulations.
This paper contributes to the existing debate on the involvement of individuals in law
enforcement activities by analysing it from an EU law perspective. Taking the example of
the Automon app as a case study, it will analyse for the ﬁrst time the lawfulness of initiat-
ives that proactively require the involvement of individuals in investigation activities and
will confront them with the data protection standards of the European Union (EU).3 This
legal analysis is augmented by the presence of discussions based on surveillance
studies and science and technology studies. The presence of these other ﬁelds of study
helps to better understand the individuals’ involvement in surveillance activities.
After this short introduction, section two provides background information on the role
of technologies in the involvement of citizens in police activities, crowdsourced surveil-
lance and digilantism.4 Section three analyses the Automon app in light of the current
legal framework at EU level, including insights from the case law of the European Court
of Human Rights (ECtHR). Before turning to the conclusion (section ﬁve), in section four
the legal implications of the ﬁndings of the previous sections are discussed.
The Automon app: surveillance, game, or both?
Lots of people, elderly, but also youngsters were running on the street looking after Poké-
mons. So we said: Hey, if they are looking after Pokémons, can they go after stolen cars?
(Bart Driessen, Dutch national police force)
This section introduces the Automon app under scrutiny in this paper. Throughout the
section other apps, technological solutions, and academic literature from various disci-
plines will be used to sketch the background against which the Automon app can be
understood. This underscores the wider relevance of the analysis, and the importance
of understanding the legal ramiﬁcations of the app: Many similar apps, often for slightly
diﬀerent purposes or target audiences, have already been developed and many more
can be expected.
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Note that the description of the Automon app in this paper is primarily based on a tele-
phone interview conducted in June 2018 with Police Commissioner Bart Driessen, who is
responsible for the development of the Automon app within the Dutch national police
force. This interview was followed up with several questions over email, stretching into
January 2019. At that point a beta version of the app had been ﬁnished and a decision
Figure 1. A screenshot of the map view in the Pokémon Go game published by Niantic, Inc. Screenshot
taken by the authors on an Android device on 1 May 2018.
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was being awaited on small-scale ﬁeld testing in a regional police unit. It is possible that as
a result of these tests the app will undergo signiﬁcant changes before being released pub-
licly. The authors have not been able to test the app themselves. Throughout the article it
is indicated where information from the interview and email correspondence has been
used.
First, the background of the Automon app is discussed: what problems does it, and
others like it, hope to solve? In the next subsection, the importance of the selection of
users and how they are instructed is considered. In the ﬁnal subsection, attention is
paid to how they are enticed to keep using the app.
Background
A typical Automon app usage scenario could begin with the user spotting a suspicious
vehicle.5 The user opens the Automon app and takes a picture of the car, after which Auto-
matic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) software embedded in the app picks out the
number plate and reads it. The number plate and some information on e.g. the app
user and the location where the photo is taken are then sent to the police server where
the number plate is compared with the publicly accessible database of the Rijksdienst
voor het Wegverkeer (RDW, state service for road traﬃc) to check whether the vehicle is
stolen. If this results in a ‘hit’ either a police patrol car is deployed immediately or a
towing company is contacted to secure the vehicle. The user is rewarded for his eﬀorts
with some points that can be used for an in-app car-related collection game, whether
the vehicle was stolen or not. Finally, she/he might be able to claim a monetary reward
from insurance companies if the car indeed was stolen.
Although these core mechanics are very simple, serious investments in time andmoney
are needed from the Dutch National Police Force to make this app a reality. As such, a close
look at the app can tell us much about what is considered important at this particular
moment by the Dutch Police (Lupton 2014). As Bart Driessen of the Dutch Police noted
in the telephone interview, these investments are made because a key goal for the
Dutch police is getting ordinary citizens involved in tackling crime. The police depends
on information from the public for most of its work, and the public is mostly very
willing to provide it. He estimated that about eighty to ninety percent of all suspects in
the Netherlands are caught red-handed after a call from a concerned citizen. However,
when it comes to vehicle theft, the public doesn’t have the tools to recognise stolen
cars: ‘If you don’t tell the public what is stolen, they can’t look for it, and they cannot
call us when they see somebody with stolen property.’
An interesting early example of a similar tactic was the call from the police to submit
images, and tag people in submitted images, during riots in Vancouver that broke out
in 2011 after the Vancouver Canucks lost the Stanley Cup ﬁnals to the Boston Bruins.
During and immediately after the riots, many people used their smartphones to make pic-
tures of the participants and to document the turmoil, which were then shared on social
media, such as a Facebook page dedicated to the riots (Schneider and Trottier 2012). This
gave the police the possibility to identify many rioters with pictures and names on the
bases of comments of other social media users even as the riots continued. Although
this shows the willingness of the public to share information with the police, it also
points to some limitations that the Automon app tries to take away. The ad-hoc nature
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of the appeal – perhaps suitable for extraordinary events like a mass riot, but wholly
inadequate for more ordinary and continuous problems such as car theft – is replaced
by a more permanent call for action, and the reliance upon platforms that are owned
and operated by outside companies is reduced.
On the one hand, then, Automon is a tool given to interested citizens in order to help
them support the police. On the other hand, it is also a tool to channel that support, as
police forces and individual police oﬃcers within them often hold varying views on the
reliability of citizens, citing fears of vigilantism and other forms of ‘cowboy-ish’ behaviours
when citizens are actively involved in neighbourhood watch groups (Pridmore et al. 2018,
14). Therefore, the police prefers to be involved in such bottom up initiatives, often joining
the WhatsApp conversation of a neighbourhood watch group, or keeping in close contact
with moderators and other group leaders (Pridmore et al. 2018, 12–16; Spiller and L’Hoiry
2018).
An interesting counter-example to the Vancouver riots which illustrates these fears is
formed by the Boston bombings in April 2013. Shortly after two bombs exploded at the
ﬁnish line of the Boston marathon and killed three people, a collective eﬀort was
started on online forums, most notably Reddit.com, to support law enforcement auth-
orities by identifying the bombers (Cassa et al. 2013; Lee 2013; Davis, Alves, and Sklansky
2014; Starbird et al. 2014). However, several people were wrongly identiﬁed as suspects,
and three days after the bombing the Boston police felt forced to release photos of the
actual suspects – two brothers – in order to prevent retaliatory violence against those
wrongly targeted. Upon seeing their photos on the news the suspects panicked and
ﬂed, killing one police oﬃcer in a botched attempt to steal his gun (Montgomery,
Fisher, and Branigin 2013; Montgomery, Horwitz, and Fisher 2013). After a tense 22 hour
manhunt, including a shootout where a police oﬃcer sustained fatal wounds from an
improvised hand grenade and where one of the suspects died after being run over by
his brother who was ﬂeeing the scene in a stolen SUV, the remaining suspect was arrested.
Similarly, in the aftermath of the November 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, the Brussels
police had to ask Twitter users to remain silent because tweets could give away police
movements in real time – to which the public dutifully responded by ﬂooding related
hashtags with cat pictures (Rawlison 2015). Although these two terrorist attacks and sub-
sequent manhunts are perhaps not typical of the police investigations they were covered
extensively in the news, including in the Netherlands, establishing a narrative where mobs
of internet detectives can run amok and cause real harm to ongoing police investigations
and police oﬃcers.
In the view of the Dutch police, then, the Automon app responds to an already existing
willingness amongst the public to contribute to police work and channels that support
(see e.g. Timan and Albrechtslund 2018, 855). However, seen from a more critical perspec-
tive the Automon app also ﬁts in an ongoing trend of using networked computing tech-
nologies to responsibilise citizens for government tasks (e.g. Koskela 2011; van Brakel and
de Hert 2011; Marx 2013; Trottier 2014; Mantello 2016; Larsson 2017; Purenne and Palierse
2017; Vera and Torsten 2017; Cardullo and Kitchin 2018; Millie 2018, 201; Pridmore et al.
2018). Mantello (2016, 2) poignantly called such forms of surveillance ‘Ikeaveillance
[which] encourages citizens to do the securitization footwork of the state by oﬀering
them the opportunity to participate in do-it-yourself, reward-centered, pro-active, net-
worked and, at times, and [sic] gamiﬁed versions of automated governance’ (italics in
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original). On this view, the app mostly exists to oﬄoad what should be police tasks to an
untrained and unpaid volunteer workforce that cannot – but perhaps should, as we shall
see in the next section – be held accountable.
Such responsibilisation campaigns often take the form of crowdsourcing. Crowdsour-
cing is the distribution of many small tasks to participants in order to obtain a cumulative
result, such as Google’s reCAPTCHA program in which website users can prove they are
not bots by clicking on images of e.g. vehicles and traﬃc signs and thereby contribute
to a machine learning dataset to be used by self-driving cars. When smartphones are
used in crowdsourcing applications, it is often called crowdsensing, a term ﬁrst coined
by Ganti, Ye, and Lei (2011). Crowdsensing is especially well-suited for collecting data
from public places as people often carry their smartphones with them wherever they
go. Crowdsensing application can be anything from fully participatory to fully opportunis-
tic (Ganti, Ye, and Lei 2011, 32). Whereas participatory applications require the active invol-
vement of the smartphone user to upload sensor data, opportunistic crowdsensing
applications require minimal eﬀort. Crowdsensing applications are also often Location
Based Services (LBS): ‘computer applications (especially mobile computing applications)
that deliver information tailored to the location and context of the device and the user’
(Huang et al. 2018, 1). Examples include navigation apps and certain social network
such as FourSquare. Often, the relationship between the LBS-app and the user is reciprocal
but not necessarily equal: not only does the app user receive tailored information but
location (and other) data is collected in an opportunistic crowdsensed manner from her
to make the app more valuable to other users and, consequently, its owners. Take for
example Google Maps, which uses location data to show a map of the direct surroundings
of the user. At the same time, it uses this data to calculate traﬃc conditions.
Such a reciprocal relationship also exists within the Automon app. On the one hand, the
users gain the possibility to receive a ﬁnancial reward for spotting a stolen car, a game
embedded in the app, and the possibility to ﬁght crime in their direct surroundings or
work environment (see the below sub-section). On the other hand, the police receives
the location of stolen vehicles and consequently the possibility to apprehend more crim-
inals without investing heavily in its investigation capabilities. The app user must partici-
pate actively before this data-sharing takes place and, in contrast to some of the examples
in the previous paragraph, is completely transparent. This transparency, however, does not
absolve the Automon app from Ikeaveillanism which, as will be discussed in the legal
analysis below, also has important legal repercussions under the new personal data pro-
tection regime of the EU.
Directing the surveillant gaze
When citizens are enrolled in surveillance practices, they must learn how to apply a ‘sur-
veillant gaze’ (Marx 1988; Foucault 1995) to their surroundings. They must learn to spot
what is suspicious, out of place, and in need of further scrutiny because it does not
belong in the normal state of aﬀairs (Curry 2004; Larsson 2017, 97). Automon users
receive points for merely scanning a number plate; the app stops short of asking from
its users anything beyond this gaze. Bart Driessen pointed out that, if a stolen vehicle is
found with the app, users are also not supposed to actively engage with it beyond alerting
the authorities (See also Larsson 2017, 103):
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The Automon app users go after stolen cars, [however] no chasing, no ﬁghting, only obser-
vation is what’s really going on.
How does the app direct this surveillant gaze that is central to the app and its usefulness
for the police? One way in which the Automon app does this is by sending out notiﬁca-
tions. These notiﬁcations are pushed out to users who are close to where a car theft
has recently taken place and contain a description of the car to look out for. Not only
does the app direct the gaze of the users when a car has recently been stolen nearby, it
also urges surveillance of the streets for stolen cars as a quotidian practice (See also
Lyon 2018) as explained by Bart Driessen:
So we have some help function [in the Automon app] to say, okay, when is it useful to make a
picture? So you can see on the car, for instance, a broken window, or the lock is broken, or
something else is going on when a car is standing in the street, standing there for a few
days and nobody knows where that car is from. We say, okay, that it’s possible that it’s
stolen, so make of that kind of car pictures.
Because of their openness to interpretation and lack of enforcement mechanism within or
outside of the app, these instructions for quotidian surveillance are more like guidelines
than actual rules (Verbinski 2003). Users are free – and even encouraged (see the next sub-
section) – to interpret them broadly and scan as many number plates as they like in order
to score more points for the in-app collection game.
As the discretionary power to (not) surveil lies squarely with the users, the makeup of
the user base is very important: a car that looks suspicious to one person might seem per-
fectly normal to the next. It will be the users that direct the surveillant gaze according to
their sense of what a normal car should look like (Larsson 2017, 98, 102; Ritsema van Eck
2018, 163–164). Unfortunately, describing the actual makeup of the user base of Pokémon
Go is not possible at the time of writing, as the app is still in development. Bart Driessen
did point out that initially the app will be actively marketed to two groups of users: those
who work in the car industry and gamers.
With regards to the ﬁrst group, it is diﬃcult to predict how they will utilise their surveil-
lant gaze. On the one hand, some car dealerships might be more than happy to scan the
license plates of all cars oﬀered to them in order not to be complicit in criminal activities. A
possible motive for this course of action is that all businesses who encounter suspicious
transactions are obliged to report them6 and the ANPR-capabilities of the app might be
a time-saving way of ensuring compliance. On the other hand, businesses might choose
not to jeopardise lucrative partnerships despite concerns over the origin of (some of)
the cars being oﬀered to them. Furthermore, the game-like user interface of the app
might dissuade well-meaning employees from using it out of fear to be seen playing
games on their smartphones during work, either by their boss or by visiting customers.
Finally, cars are (re-)sold through a multitude of channels and it seems probable that a
criminal, if in possession of a stolen car that she/he wishes to sell, will avoid oﬃcial chan-
nels where the Automon appmight be used. As Bart Driessen pointed out in the telephone
interview, many stolen cars are swiftly exported to e.g. Africa and Russia. In those cases, the
many narrowly focused surveillant gazes will still miss that which lies just outside their ﬁeld
of vision (Latour 2005, 181).
The second group to which the app will be marketed are gamers (Figure 2). In this
manner, the police hopes to beneﬁt from the popularity of Pokémon Go and other
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mobile games. However, it is not clear how this will be done. If the police aims to
approach gamers directly, then the police must be able to ﬁrst identify them. Besides
the data processing activity that this will require one might also ask: What sets apart
a gamer from a non-gamer? The label of ‘gamer’ hardly discriminates in today’s world.
Pokémon Go, which was downloaded over 800 million times worldwide (Harris 2018),
itself is a demonstration that especially casual mobile gaming has become a mainstream
activity.7 Furthermore: how will the police market to this group? Assuming that ‘gamers’
and ‘non-gamers’ exist, it is not clear how the police will identify the former and
Figure 2. A screenshot of the map view in a prototype of the Automon app. Notice how it uses a sty-
lised map in a similar manner to Pokémon Go (see Figure 1), albeit with a cooler colour scheme. Screen-
shot provided by the Dutch Police.
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approach them to enrol them. If the police aims to approach gamers indirectly, then the
call must be sent to the general public at large. Those that are willing to collaborate with
the police and that are gamers or that are willing to play this particular game will be
enrolled. The composition of this part of the projected user base thus also remains
unclear, as will their surveillant gaze.
Despite this uncertainty, two general hypotheses can be postulated about how gamers8
might use their surveillant gaze: First, if they try to score points in Automon, they might
scan as many number plates as possible. This would entail a rather unselective surveillant
gaze, aimed at any number plate in reach. Second, the competition from the mobile
gaming market is ﬁerce, oversaturated as it is with engaging games produced by large
teams of designers. If a user approaches Automon as a game rather than as a tool to
support the police, the unique qualities are quickly lost and other games might be
more rewarding to play. The surveillant gaze would then become distracted and drift
away.
Taking a broader view, in the academic literature bias and discrimination are seen as
concerning by-products when surveillance technologies are put in the hand of citizens.
Locative social media are mostly used in white and high income areas (Anselin and Wil-
liams 2016, 318). This could lead to more police resources being spent on those areas com-
pared to low-income areas (Joh 2014, 2016). It remains to be seen whether this eﬀect
carries over to locative participatory surveillance apps, but at the very least smartphone
ownership is presupposed. Excluded are those who do not possess a smartphone, or
the necessary skills to install and use apps. Furthermore, Purenne and Palierse (2017,
88) found that such tools are used to keep those who are ‘others’ out of homogenous
areas. It is possible that the app aims the surveillant gaze at cars rather than people will
dampen this eﬀect. It is equally possible, however, that people who are part of a disadvan-
taged group ﬁnd their number plates will be scanned more often (See also e.g. Gandy
2000, 2006; Ritsema van Eck 2018, 168–169). After all, can ‘someone like that’ really
aﬀord a ‘car like that’?
Gamiﬁcation and rewards
Users will primarily experience the Automon app as a game. Compare for instance the user
interface design of the garage in ‘Asphalt 9,’ a popular smartphone racing game, with that
of Automon in, respectively, Figures 3 and 4. Presenting the app as entertaining and excit-
ing is done in order to maintain the surveillant gaze once it is established; The Automon
app needs to ﬁght for attention with myriad distractions both on and oﬀ the smartphone
screen. Two main rewards have been built into the Automon app in order to encourage
users to continue using the app and scan as many number plates of suspicious cars as
possible: in-game points and, in certain cases, a monetary reward.
The gamiﬁcation mainly takes the form of a ‘Pimp my Ride’ style game, in which gamers
can ‘pimp up’ cars in the virtual garage in the app using in-game currency, buying increas-
ingly desirable cars and car parts (see Figure 4). Note that, in contrast to many racing
games which employ similar upgrading mechanics, it seems there is no beneﬁt to
buying more cars or upgrading them. In-game points can be earned by scanning
number plates, and certain special actions and milestones, such as scanning ﬁfty
number plates, might earn the player bonus in-game points.
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The monetary reward on the other hand would only be given out if a user scans the
number plate of a stolen car, which would then lead to the successful retrieval of the
car in question. As this might save an insurance company from having to pay out a
claim, it could utilise (part of) these savings to reward the user who scanned the license
plate. When the interview with Bart Driessen was being conducted, the details of the mon-
etary reward were still being negotiated with insurance companies, some of which were
hesitant to cooperate. In order for the monetary reward to be paid out, some personal
Figure 3. A screenshot of the garage view in the Asphalt 9 mobile racing game published by Gameloft
SE. Screenshot taken by the authors on an Android device on 19 October 2018.
Figure 4. A screenshot of the garage view in a prototype of the Automon app, showing a car which can
be upgraded, or ‘pimped’, using in-game currency. Screenshot provided by the Dutch Police.
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data must be stored on the police server in order to be able to identify the user who
scanned the number plate.
Gamiﬁed participatory surveillance is not without its critics, such as Julie E. Cohen, who
argues forcefully that gamiﬁcation should not be confused with innocuous play (2016,
210–211). Whereas play is ‘quite consciously outside “ordinary” life as being “not
serious”’ (Huizinga 1980, 13), the Automon app outsources a task of law enforcement to
the public, packaged as an entertaining pastime. However, play ‘is an activity connected
with no material interest, and no proﬁt can be gained by it’ (Huizinga 1980). There is
then a tension between the playful experience of scoring points and upgrading cars on
the one hand, and the very serious interests of the police and insurance companies on
the other hand.
Before engaging in the legal analysis, it can be concluded that the police seems to be
betting on two horses with regards to various aspects of the Automon app. The police
wants to collect as many number plates as possible, but not become engulfed in a
torrent of useless data provided by over-eager participants. Similarly, the police aspires
to steer the surveillant gaze of the Automon app users towards cars that might be
stolen property, but also rewards the bulk scanning of number plates with in-game
points. Finally, in the hopes of solving the quite serious problem of car theft, the police
has chosen a whimsical, game-like form. As a result of these divergences, the Automon
app is neither a dedicated surveillance app, nor a dedicated game.
Legal analysis
After discussing the merits and demerits of the Automon app and its double function as a
game and a surveillance tool, this section takes a legal approach and analyses the compat-
ibility of the app with the EU data protection framework. With the introduction of the app,
law enforcement aims to beneﬁt from the willingness of the individuals to collaborate.
However, the new data protection regime in the EU might create further legal implications
that were not discussed at the time the app was initiated. Attention is paid in this section
especially to the GDPR and to the Police Directive. The section will ﬁrst analyse the nature
of the data collected via the Automon app. Then, it will establish the applicable law. Finally
yet importantly, the legal positions that the applicable legal rules assign to the various
actors involved are analysed. The analysis presented here has a wider applicability than
just to the Automon app as the trends described in the ‘Background’ subsection above
will probably lead to a multitude of similar initiatives by police forces throughout Europe.
Automon app data as personal data
In order to establish if the EU data protection framework is applicable, we must ﬁrst estab-
lish whether the data collected via the Automon app qualify as personal data. As explained
in the interview by Bart Driessen, the number plate is the only data that the app will collect
and that will be further processed. Thus, we need to assess if number plates qualify as per-
sonal data. Personal data are deﬁned in the GDPR, article 4(1) and the Police Directive,
article 3(1), as any information relating to an identiﬁed or identiﬁable natural person. An
identiﬁable person is further deﬁned as him who can be identiﬁed, directly or indirectly,
in particular: ‘… by reference to an identiﬁer such as a name, an identiﬁcation number,
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location data, an online identiﬁer or to one or more factors speciﬁc to the physical, phys-
iological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person’.
The veriﬁcation of these conditions is obvious for number plates since their raison d’être
lies in facilitating the identiﬁcation of the person to whom a vehicle is registered.9 In the
EU legal framework for data to qualify as personal, identiﬁcation should be possible by the
controller or any other person with ‘means reasonably likely to be used […] to identify the
natural person directly or indirectly’.10 In the case of number plates, the obvious means of
identiﬁcation are the vehicle registration databases that each Member State is required to
maintain.11 For an Automon app user the access to the vehicle registration database is
possible only in very speciﬁc situations in the presence of a legitimate interest.
For law enforcement (which qualiﬁes as the data controller in this case; see the subsec-
tion ‘Automon app users under the Police Directive’ below) such access to the RDW data-
base is much easier. Advocate General Sánchez-Bordona in his opinion in Breyer explained
that ‘reasonable’ in cases of indirect identiﬁcation of individuals should be understood to
denote at least that those means are lawful.12 The Court of Justice followed this line of
reasoning in its decision.13 Whether the police actually uses this authority either in
general or in speciﬁc cases does not matter.14 In the example of the Automon app, the
police can indirectly identify the owner of any vehicle in the RDW database using the
number plates provided by Automon app users. Therefore, all number plates are personal
data. Finally, the police will have ﬁles on any stolen vehicles, making direct identiﬁcation
possible for those number plates that belong to stolen vehicles. Thus, number plates
qualify as personal data: The strict European personal data protection framework should
be applied to what might seem an amusing diversion.
GDPR or Police Directive?
Data protection laws ﬁrst emerged to protect individuals against the eﬀects of the ever-
increasing exposure of their personal information to public authorities; later, they were
expanded to also include protections against interferences by the private sector
(Gstrein and Ritsema van Eck 2018, 79). Thus, individuals have traditionally been the ‘ben-
eﬁciaries’ of data protection. Over time, however, the role of the individual has shifted. Due
to the rapid development of technology and its increasing availability, individuals have
acquired capabilities that were previously reserved for the state or large private organis-
ations. As such, individuals today are not only data subjects but also potential data con-
trollers and processors.
Despite the fact that there are no speciﬁc rules at EU level regulating the collaboration
between law enforcement and citizens, the legislation on data protection is very broad
and accommodates such situations. In their work on community policing in EU law, Al-
Sharieh and Mifsud Bonnici (2018, 182) ﬁnd the legal bases for such activities broadly in
the rule of law and the crime prevention framework.
Generally, the GDPR applies when individuals process personal data of their fellow citi-
zens.15 In principle, this would be the case also when individuals in a public space capture
with their cameras images of number plates. Exceptions to this general rule are the pro-
cessing of personal data that take place in the course of purely personal and household
activities,16 processing of data that falls in the area of Common Foreign and Security
Policy,17 and processing for law enforcement activities for the scope of prevention,
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detection, investigation and prosecution of crime.18 In the latest case, the Police Directive
applies.19
There are no indications that the Automon app collects and processes data for foreign,
security and defence policy purposes. If the app had only one function, the gaming one,
the exception of purely personal and household activities would have been valid, but the
double function of the app as a game and as a surveillance tool changes the situation. The
fact that the data are sent to the RWD for veriﬁcation and that the main scope of the pro-
cessing is determined by law enforcement, eliminates the exclusion of the purely domestic
activity. The discussion of the last exclusion that will have as an eﬀect the application of
the Police Directive is more complicated.
The Police Directive applies to the processing of personal data by competent auth-
orities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of crim-
inal oﬀences or the execution of criminal penalties, including the safeguarding against and
the prevention of threats to public security. The deﬁnition of competent authorities
extends beyond law enforcement authorities as it also applies to any other body or
entity entrusted by Member State law to exercise public authority and public powers.20
We argue that the activity of individuals that collaborate with law enforcement by using
the Automon app falls under the scope of the application of the Directive.
The app is designed by law enforcement to assist them in their activities. Because of the
dual function of the app, as a game and as a surveillance tool, all app users operate as an
extended arm of law enforcement and assist in the performance of their duties. The users
of the app perform criminal investigation and detection activities, which are typical of law
enforcement. As it has been clariﬁed in the case law of the ECtHR, the rights of the indi-
viduals will be seriously endangered if the law enforcement could evade its legal obli-
gations by making use of private agents.21 Thus, situations in which the police may not
have been directly involved, but in which they have worked with or trusted individuals
to collect information also fall within the scope of law enforcement activities.22 In our
case, in order to avoid the possibility that law enforcement agencies can circumvent
their legal obligations (Purtova 2018, 59) by making use of individuals that carry out law
enforcement tasks via smartphone games, the Police Directive should apply
The Directive introduces a level for data protection for individuals in the framework of
law enforcement activities as well as a number of obligations for data controllers and pro-
cessors without referring to a cross border element. Thus, activities that are purely national
also fall within the scope of the application of the Directive. To comply with the Police
Directive the processing of personal data must be: lawful and fair, speciﬁed, explicit and
for a legitimate purpose, adequate and not excessive, accurate and kept up to date
when necessary, kept in a form which permits identiﬁcation of the data subject for no
longer than is necessary and, secured from unauthorised or unlawful processing.23
While these principles seem to be generally addressed by the design of the app, other
legal aspects need consideration and are discussed below.
Automon app users under the Police Directive
After establishing in the previous section that the Police Directive applies when individuals
collaborate with the law enforcement, this section will discuss more speciﬁcally the roles
that it attributes to law enforcement and Automon app users.
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF LAW, COMPUTERS & TECHNOLOGY 13
As stated in its recital 7, the Police Directive aims to ensure an equivalent level of pro-
tection of the rights and freedoms of natural persons with regard to the processing of per-
sonal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation,
detection or prosecution of criminal oﬀences or the execution of criminal penalties, includ-
ing the safeguarding against and the prevention of threats to public security in all Member
States. However, it provides only for the minimum standards of protection since, in imple-
menting it, Member States are allowed to introduce higher safeguards for the protection
of the rights and freedoms of the data subject.24
After establishing that the data collected in the framework of the Automon app qualify
as personal it is easy to establish the data subject. As it was explained by Bart Driessen, the
only data that the app will collect are the number plates, leaving out all the irrelevant parts
of the picture taken by the app user. Following this explanation, since on the basis of a
number plate the owner of the vehicle can be identiﬁed, she/he qualiﬁes as the data
subject. In addition, also the controller and processor can be easily identiﬁed.
According to article 3(8) of the Police Directive:
‘“controller” means the competent authority which, alone or jointly with others, determines
the purposes and means of the processing of personal data’. The processor is: ‘a natural or
legal person, public authority, agency or other body which processes personal data on
behalf of the controller’.25
Processing of data also includes the data collection activity. In the case of the Automon
app, the law enforcement establishes and determines – quite literally – the rules of the
game and the reasons for processing the collected data (see also the sub-section ‘directing
the surveillant gaze’). Thus, by designing the affordances of the app, thereby allowing
certain and denying other actions, and supporting this by clear instructions to the
users, the Dutch police clearly qualiﬁes as the controller. The individuals that collect and
process the data are the data processors.
Thus, the provisions of the Police Directive give a legal status to individuals collaborat-
ing with the law enforcement, even in the seemingly innocuous and playful context of an
online game. They are not only natural persons enjoying an app but data processors that
are subject to the legal rules and which have speciﬁc duties and obligations on the basis of
the Police Directive.
Discussion and implications
As was shown in the previous section, the game-like façade cannot hold up to close legal
scrutiny. The qualiﬁcation of the activity performed with the Automon app under the
Police Directive has a number of legal implication that have to be taken into consideration
by law enforcement agencies that are considering using similar tools to increase the par-
ticipation of the public.
Firstly, the Police Directive aims to ensure the protection of standards when law enfor-
cement collaborates with speciﬁc processors to safeguard the rights of data subjects.
Processors may only be selected by the controller if they implement appropriate techni-
cal and organisational measures in such a manner that the processing will meet the
requirements of the Directive and will ensure the protection of the rights of the data
subject.26 This provision is clear and precise in its wording and it leaves very little
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space for the Member States to manoeuvre, unless for introducing even stricter require-
ments. Speciﬁcally, the Dutch law implementing the Police Directive27 introduced article
6c to the Wet politiegegevens (Police data law) on verwerkers (processors). Together with
the delegated legislation28 which added article 6:1b to the Besluit politiegegevens
(Decision police data), it almost literally transposes the conditions laid down in the
Police Directive.
In its current design, the Automon app does not comply with this requirement. In the
Automon app, game participants carry out the collection of data on behalf of the law
enforcement. It is not law enforcement, as the controller, that chooses its collaborators.
They are self-selected by voluntarily downloading the app and participating in the
game. They might be anybody, independent of how protected their devices are. Law
enforcement can also not ensure that individuals will implement appropriate technical
and organisational measures. It cannot ensure that the data will not be used for other pur-
poses or that will not be retained by the app users for a longer period than the one estab-
lished by the law. As a result, the Automon app and practices similar to it infringe the
safeguards of the data protection rules.
Secondly, there is another general principle that the collaboration of the individuals
with the police in ways similar to the Automon app might infringe. This is the proportion-
ality principle that must guide decisions of law enforcement to interfere with the funda-
mental rights of the individuals, including their right to data protection (Milaj 2015).
This principle determines the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for limiting a protected
right (Barak 2012, 3) as well as serves to restrict the exercise of powers from the State auth-
orities (van den Brink et al. 2007, 143).
As it was argued also in the previous section under the ‘surveillant gaze’, law enforce-
ment may receive a large amount of personal data through Automon from non-qualiﬁed
and non-specialised sources. Consequently, not all the data transferred to law enforce-
ment by individuals will be relevant. This will be the case especially in those situations
in which individuals by themselves have suspicions that a vehicle might be stolen and
thus make pictures that they send in via the app. The problem is only exacerbated by
the game-like design of Automon. As a result, law enforcement will be overloaded with
personal data that, even if there is no match with a stolen car, will show the location of
speciﬁc vehicles at speciﬁc points in time and thus reveal unjustiﬁably large amounts of
personal data. It cannot be excluded that these data might be the result of various
biases or incorrect information. When the Automon app is conceptualised as a game
this might not be particularly problematic, but for a police surveillance tool it is deeply
troublesome.
Note that Dutch police aims to reduce this eﬀect by immediately deleting any data on
number plates sent to them that do not result in a ‘hit.’ Furthermore, the ANPR system is
integrated in the app on the smartphone, thus only the number plate data is transmitted
to the police servers and not the rest of the photo that might contain more personal data.
Although prima facie eﬀective measures to stem the collection of unnecessary personal
information, they might create a tension with article 25 of the Police Directive29 which
requires that logs are kept of the ‘collection, alteration, consultation, disclosure including
transfers, combination, and erasure’ of personal data in automated processing systems. It
goes on to specify that
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The logs of consultation and disclosure shall make it possible to establish the justiﬁcation,
date and time of such operations and, as far as possible, the identiﬁcation of the person
who consulted or disclosed personal data, and the identity of the recipients of such personal
data.
When a no-hit occurs in the Automon system only collection and erasure take place, but
no consultation and disclosure. Therefore, it would seem that as long as logs are kept, they
can be devoid of any personal data. However, no logs seem to be kept at all in the current
design of Automon.
Thirdly and ﬁnally, article 27 of the Police Directive requires that a Data Protection
Impact Assessment (DPIA) takes place ‘where a type of processing, in particular, using
new technologies’ is likely to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of
natural persons. Following the guidelines of the Article 29 Data Protection Working
Party’s (A29WP)30 DPIAs should be carried out as early as is practicable (2017, 25). In
this manner, DPIAs can support decision makers during the design phase. At the
moment, however, such an assessment has not yet taken place. Bart Driessen indicated
that any data protection considerations are put on hold until a ﬁnal decision has been
made on the location of the ﬁeld tests. By relegating these considerations to a separate
part of the process to be completed at a later date, the DPIA can no longer play the sup-
porting role in following the privacy by design principles31 that the A29WP accords it
(2017, 25).
From the above implications, it is clear that the Automon app does not comply with the
European legislation on data protection. As a result, practices like the Automon app, inde-
pendent of any evaluation on their usefulness or gameplay value, do not fulﬁl the legal
requirements and thus strictly qualify as unlawful. Law enforcement could therefore be
subject to ﬁnes (the amount of which is established by each Member State when imple-
menting the Police Directive – in the Netherlands the maximum applicable ﬁne is currently
set at €830,000.00)32 or even to judicial processes initiated by the Data Protection Auth-
ority or individuals who feel their rights have been infringed.
Conclusion
The Automon app is developed by the Dutch Police to involve citizens in law enforcement
activities and to extend the scope of action of the police without expanding its force. The
app ﬁts within a larger trend of providing the general public with automated tools that
they can use to participate in police work. Such tools respond to various needs felt by
both law enforcement and citizens alike by using game-like elements to direct the surveil-
lant gaze of participants. Even when the goals of such tools are lofty and the form in which
citizens can participate is decidedly ludic, these activities are subject to legal rules. Thus far,
there are no speciﬁc rules on police-citizen interaction at EU level. The EU legal framework
adopted in 2016, which aims to conform the activity of law enforcement to data protection
rules, did not consider speciﬁcally this emerging trend. The general data protection rules
applicable to law enforcement are, however, broad and, as it was analysed in this paper,
cover also the individuals’ participation in police investigations.
The Automon app design was initiated before the adoption of the Police Directive,
when the national rules were the ones regulating the ﬁeld. Today, it fails to comply
with these general rules established by the Directive on three grounds. Firstly, it cannot
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ensure that law enforcement makes use only of processors that demonstrate to have
adopted appropriate technical and organisational measures in such a manner that the pro-
cessing will meet the requirements of the Directive and ensure the protection of the rights
of the data subject. Secondly, the proportionality of the interference with the private life of
the individuals, as for example their location at a speciﬁc point in time (Woods 2017),
cannot be ensured. Thirdly, although this should have been the case, a DPIA has not
yet taken place.
As a result, we argue that using the Automon app or similar applications by law enfor-
cement does not meet the requirements prescribed by the current legal regime. This is a
clear example of the disconnection between law and technology that reﬂects how legal
rules lag behind any technological advances. To overcome such a situation, speciﬁc
rules regulating the police-citizen interaction are desirable. Since the provisions of the
Police Directive on the use of external processors by law enforcement are suﬃciently
clear, precise and unconditional, there is no space for the national legislator to ﬁll the
gap. Therefore, any new legal intervention is to be taken at European level.
Notes
1. The Pokémon Go app was released in the summer of 2016. It utilizes the player’s mobile
device’s GPS ability to locate, capture, battle, and train virtual creatures, called Pokémon,
which appear on the screen as if they were at the same real-world location as the player.
2. Note that ‘Automon’ is being used as a working title. It seems likely that a possible ﬁnal version
will use a diﬀerent name, because ‘Automon’ is also a company which develops case manage-
ment software for probation agencies in the United States of America, see (‘About Us’ 2018).
Furthermore, Automon is one of the main antagonists in a Power Rangers episode (Koichi
2002).
3. More speciﬁcally: Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal
data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR)) [2016] OJ L119/1; and Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with
regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities or the purposes of the pre-
vention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal oﬀences or the execution of crim-
inal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework
Decision 2008/977/JHA (Police Directive) [2016] OJ L119/89.
4. A portmanteau of ‘digital’ and ‘vigilante’ (seemingly) ﬁrst coined by Ruth Martin (2007).
5. The app provides guidance on what characteristics a user might want to look out for, a point
to which we will return below.
6. Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the
prevention of the use of the ﬁnancial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist
ﬁnancing, amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the
Council, and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC [2015] OJ L141/73, art 33.
7. In 2015 there were 3.429 billion mobile broadband subscriptions worldwide (ITU Telecommu-
nication Development Bureau 2015). This means that Pokémon Go was installed on approxi-
mately 1 in 4.3 smartphones with internet access worldwide.
8. Beyond the two speciﬁc user bases initially targeted by the police, Automon will also be open
to the general public. It can be hypothesized that their surveillant gaze will be similar to that of
gamers discussed here.
9. Convention on Road Traﬃc (concluded 8 November 1986, entered into force 21 May 1977)
1042 UNTS 17, art 35–36.
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10. GDPR, recital 26; Police Directive, recital 21.
11. Convention on Road Traﬃc (n 9), art 35–36.
12. Case C–582/14 Patrick Breyer v Bundesrepublik Deutschland EU:C:2016:339, Opinion of AG
Sánchez-Bordona, paras 68–73.
13. Case C–582/14 Breyer (n 12), para 46.
14. Case C–582/14 Breyer (n 12), para 47–48.
15. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on
the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the
free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regu-
lation) (GDPR) [2016] OJ L119/88.
16. GDPR, art 2(2)c.
17. GDPR, art 2(2)b.
18. GDPR, art 2(2)d.
19. Police Directive, art 1(1).
20. Police Directive, recital 11, art 3(7).
21. Van Vondel v The Netherlands App no 38258/03 (ECtHR, 25 October 2007), para 49.
22. MM v The Netherlands App no 39339/98 (ECtHR, 8 April 2003), para. 42; A v France App no
14838/89 (ECtHR, 23 November 1993), paras 38–39.
23. Police Directive, art 4(1).
24. Police Directive, art 1(3).
25. Police Directive, art 3(8).
26. Police Directive, art 22(1).
27. Wet van 17 oktober 2018 tot wijziging van de Wet politiegegevens en de Wet justitiële en
strafvorderlijke gegevens ter implementatie van Europese regelgeving over de verwerking
van persoonsgegevens met het oog op de voorkoming, het onderzoek, de opsporing en ver-
volging van strafbare feiten of de tenuitvoerlegging van straﬀen, Stb. 2018, 401.
28. Besluit van 6 december 2018 tot wijziging van het Besluit politiegegevens, het Besluit justitiële
en strafvorderlijke gegevens en het Besluit politiegegevens bijzondere opsporingsdiensten ter
implementatie van Europese regelgeving over de verwerking van persoonsgegevens met het
oog op de voorkoming, het onderzoek, de opsporing en de vervolging van strafbare feiten of
de tenuitvoerlegging van straﬀen, Stb. 2018, 496.
29. Implemented in Dutch law in article 32 of the Wet Politiegegevens.
30. These guidelines are based on the GDPR rather than the Police Directive. However, in lieu of a
similar guiding document for the police context we use these guidelines to make a preliminary
assessment. The guidelines have since been adopted by the European Data Protection Board.
31. Police Directive, art 20.
32. Wet Politiegegevens, art 35c juncto Wetboek van Strafrecht (Criminal Code), art 23(4).
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